In his seminal work Harsanyi [13] introduced an elegant approach to study non-cooperative games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some parameters. To model such games he introduced the Harsanyi transformation, which converts a game with incomplete information to a strategic game where players may have different types. In the resulting Bayesian game players' uncertainty about each others types is described by a probability distribution over all possible type profiles.
Bayesian Nash equilibria in the case of independent type distribution.
• We conclude with results on coordination ratio for the model of identical links for three social cost measures, that is, social cost as expected maximum congestion, sum of individual costs and maximum individual cost.
For the latter two we are able to give (asymptotic) tight bounds using our results on fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
Motivation and Framework. In recent years, motivated by non-cooperative systems like the Internet, combining ideas from game theory and theoretical computer science has become more and more attractive. In many of these largescale non-cooperative systems users have only incomplete information about the system for several reasons. In his seminal work Harsanyi [13] introduced an elegant approach to study non-cooperative games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some parameters. To model such games he introduced the Harsanyi transformation, which converts a game with incomplete information to a strategic game where players may have different types. In the resulting Bayesian game players' uncertainty about each others type is described by a probability distribution over all possible type profiles. Using this probability distribution, players make their decisions according to the concept of Bayesian decision theory.
In this work, we introduce a particular selfish routing game with incomplete information that we call Bayesian routing game. Here, n selfish users wish to assign their traffic to one of m links. Each link has a certain capacity which specifies the rate at which the link processes traffic. Users do not know each others traffic. Following Harsanyi's approach, we introduce for each user a set of possible types. We assume that these sets are finite. Each type of a user may have different traffic. Furthermore, we assume that there is a common probability distribution p over the set of all possible type realizations. In general p can be arbitrary, however sometimes we assume p to be independent, that is p can be expressed by n independent probability distributions, one for each user.
In a pure strategy a user chooses for each of its types a particular link whereas in a mixed strategy a user uses a probability distribution over all his possible pure strategies. A strategy profile specifies a strategy for each of the users. Users choose strategies in order to minimize their individual cost which is defined as the expected congestion. Note, that due to the Bayesian model the individual cost in a pure strategy profile is given by the expectation over the type distribution p. In the case of mixed strategy profiles, the expectation is taken over the strategies of the users and the type distribution p. Users do not cooperate with each other nor they adhere to a global objective function, the so called social cost. A stable state in which no user has an incentive to unilaterally change its strategy is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In our study we distinguish between pure and mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria. Of special interest to our work are fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria, where each user assigns each of its types to each link with strictly positive probability.
If users are completely informed about each others traffic, that is each user has only a single type, then we are in the setting of a simple model for selfish routing (called KP-model) which was introduced in the pioneering work of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16] . In this setting Bayesian Nash equilibria become Nash equilibria. As in [16] , we use the coordination ratio or price of anarchy as a measure of the maximum performance degradation due to the selfish behavior of the users. The coordination ratio can be defined with respect to different social cost measures. Contribution. Due to the new dimension that the incomplete information introduces to the routing game, solving problems for the Bayesian routing game requires new techniques. In this paper, we present a comprehensive collection of results for our Bayesian routing game. We partition our results into three major parts:
(1) Existence and computational complexity of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria:
We prove that every Bayesian routing game possesses a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In particular we introduce a potential function and show that its value decreases whenever a user unilaterally changes its strategy to improve its individual cost. This result can also be generalized to a larger class of games, called weighted Bayesian congestion games. For the model of identical links and independent type distributions we show that a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. For the model of Bayesian routing games with related links and for the model of identical links and arbitrary type distribution the complexity of determining a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium remains open.
(2) Properties of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria:
We show that in the model of identical links the individual cost of each user is maximized in a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This also implies that a user has the same individual cost in any fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We define a certain fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium that always exists. We show that in general there might exist more than one fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium and we study their structural properties. Finally, we show the dimension of the space of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria in the case of independent type distributions.
(3) Results on Coordination ratio:
We conclude our paper with results on the coordination ratio for three different social cost measures in the model of identical links.
-The expected maximum congestion on a link is a social cost measure that expresses the social welfare of the system. Here, we are able to show lower and upper bounds on the coordination ratio for different special cases. The exact coordination ratio for Bayesian routing games remains open, even for identical links.
-A social cost measure that describes average user welfare is the sum of the individual costs. In this setting, we show that for identical links, each fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium has maximum social cost. Using this fact we proof an upper bound of m+n−1 m on the coordination ratio in case of identical links. This bound is asymptotically tight, even for KP-games. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria are studied in conjunction with social cost. Related Work. The class of congestion games was introduced by Rosenthal [26] and extensively studied afterwards (see e.g. [3, 4, 8, 21, 22, 27] ). In Rosenthal's model each player has complete information and as its strategy a subset of resources. Resource utility functions can be arbitrary but they only depend on the number of players sharing the same resource. Rosenthal showed that such games always admit a pure Nash equilibrium using a potential function. Subsequent papers [3, 22, 27] characterize games that possess a potential function as potential games and show their relation to congestion games. The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was studied by Fabrikant et al. [3] . Milchtaich [21] considers weighted congestion games with player specific payoff functions and shows that these games do not admit a pure Nash equilibrium in general. Fotakis et al. [8] consider weighted congestion games and proved the existence of pure Nash equilibria, if resources have linear cost functions. The KP-model [16] for routing selfish users on parallel links, and its Nash equilibria, were studied extensively in the last years; see, for example, [2, 5, 7, 11, 15, 18] , and [6] for a recent survey. Graham's LPT scheduling algorithm [12] computes a pure Nash equilibrium in the KP-model [7] . Algorithms to transform any assignment to a Nash equilibrium with non-increased maximum congestion have been presented in [5, 9, 11] .
The coordination ratio, also known as price of anarchy [24] , was first introduced and studied by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16] . For social cost defined as the expected maximum congestion, there exist tight bounds of Θ log m log log m ¡ for identical links [2, 15] and Θ log m log log log m ¡ [2] for related links. The fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture, which states that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium has worst social cost among all Nash equilibria, was motivated by some results in [20] , explicitly formulated in [11] and further studied in [18] . For social cost defined as the sum of individual costs the conjecture holds [10, 17] .
A framework for studying competitive situations where the players have incomplete information was developed by Harsanyi. The Nobel prize-winner introduced Bayesian games in his pioneering work [13, 14] . Facchini et al. [4] consider Bayesian congestion models with players of identical weight but players have incomplete information about each others preferences. Beier et al. [1] focus on a service provider congestion game with incomplete information. For an introduction to Bayesian games we refer to [19, 23] . Road Map. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an exact definition of the Bayesian routing games considered in this paper. The existence and computation of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria is studied in Section 3. Some interesting structural properties of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria are presented in Section 4. Section 5 gives a thorough study of the coordination ratio for three definitions of social cost.
NOTATION
Instance. For all k ∈ ¢ denote [k] = {1, . . . , k}. We consider the following Bayesian routing game Γ = (n, m, c, T, p). Each of n users 1, 2, . . . , n wishes to assign a particular amount of traffic to one of m links 1, 2, . . . , m. Denote c = (c1, . . . , cm), where cj is the capacity of link j ∈ [m]. In the model of identical links all capacities are equal to 1. In this case we write Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p). Link capacities may vary arbitrary in the model of related links. For each user i ∈ [n] there is a set of possible types Ti. Denote T = T1 × . . . × Tn as the set of all possible type profiles. For each type t ∈ Ti, i ∈ [n], denote by w(t) the traffic of type t.
There is a common probability distribution (common for all users) p = (p(t1, . . . , tn)) (t 1 ,...,tn)∈T over the set of possible type profiles T , thus p : T → [0, 1]. Denote by p(i, t) the probability that user i is of type t, that is,
, that is, the probability of a type profile (t1, . . . , tn) given that t k = t is the probability of type profile (t1, . . . , tn) divided by the probability that player k is of type t; this is known as Bayes'
A special instance of Bayesian routing games in which each user only has a single type is a KP-game (see [16] ). For a KP-game we write Γ KP = (n, m, c, T, 1). The set T contains only one type vector t that is used with probability 1. Strategies and Strategy Profiles. A pure strategy σi for user i ∈ [n] is a mapping of the set of possible types Ti to the set of links [m]; thus, σi : Ti → [m]. Denote Σi as the set of all possible pure strategies for user i ∈ [n] and denote Σ = Σ1 × . . . × Σn. A mixed strategy Qi = (q(i, σi))σ i ∈Σ i for user i ∈ [n] is a probability distribution over Σi, where q(i, σi) denotes the probability that user i chooses the pure strategy σi. A pure strategy profile L is represented by an n-tuple (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σ. Call L normal if σi(t) = σi(t ) for all t, t ∈ Ti and for all i ∈ [n]. A mixed strategy profile Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) is represented by an n-tuple of mixed strategies. The support of a mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n], denoted support(i), is the set of links to which user i assigns at least one type t ∈ Ti with positive probability, that is,
with q(i, σi) > 0 and σi(t) = j}.
Similarly, the support of any type t ∈ Ti of user i ∈ [n] is defined by
Call a strategy profile
System and Individual Cost. Fix any probability distribution p over the set of possible type profiles T and a mixed strategy profile Q.
In the same way, denote δ
Note, that v (i,t) (Q, p) does not depend on the other types t ∈ Ti \ {t} of user i. Moreover, denote ui(Q, p) as the individual cost of user i; then
A strategy profile Q is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if and only if in Q no user has an incentive to deviate from its current (mixed) strategy, that is, no user can decrease its individual cost if the other users stick to their strategies.
More formally, Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if
for all Q = (Q1, . . . , Q i , . . . , Qn) and for all i ∈ [n]. Moreover, since v (i,t) (Q, p) does not depend on the other types t ∈ Ti \ {t} of user i, the above condition is equivalent to
for all Q = (Q1, . . . , Q i , . . . , Qn) and for all i ∈ [n], t ∈ Ti. Social Cost and Coordination Ratio. Associated with a Bayesian routing game Γ = (n, m, c, T, p) and strategy profile Q is the social cost as a measure of social welfare. We consider three social cost definitions:
• the expectation of the expected maximum congestion,
• the sum of individual costs,
ui(Q, p),
• the maximum individual cost,
ui(Q, p).
Let * ∈ {MSP, SUM, MAX}. Denote he corresponding optimum social cost by OPT * (Γ) = minQ SC * (Q, Γ). The coordination ratio CR * , is the maximum value, over all instances Γ and Bayesian Nash equilibria Q, of the ratio
. Type agent representation. Following Harsanyi's transformation we can also consider each type t of a user i as an independent type agent (i, t). In this setting, a mixed strategy profile is defined by R = ((r(i, t, j)) j∈[m] ) i∈[n],t∈T i , where r(i, t, j) is the probability that type agent (i, t) chooses link j. From R we can compute a mixed strategy profile
for all i ∈ [n] and all σi ∈ Σi. Note, that for pure strategy profiles both representations are isomorphic. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium R in type agent representation has the property that no type agent (i, t) can unilaterally improve its individual cost, thus,
for all strategy profiles R that result from R when only type agent (i, t) changes strategy.
Definition 2.1. Given a pure strategy profile R in type agent representation a selfish step of a type agent (i, t), i ∈ [n], t ∈ Ti, is a strategy change of this type agent which improves its individual cost. This means that
where R is the strategy profile that result from R when only type agent (i, t) changes strategy.
One could have used also the type agent representation for defining pure and mixed strategies. We feel that our notation leads to more intuitive formulations in this complex environment.
EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF PURE BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section we study the existence and the computational complexity of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria. We first show that there is always a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium in any Bayesian routing game (Theorem 3.1). This result can be generalized to a more general class of games, that we call weighted Bayesian congestion games (Theorem 3.2). We close with a polynomial time algorithm that computes a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a Bayesian routing game with identical links and independent type distribution (Theorem 3.3).
Theorem 3.1. Every Bayesian routing game Γ = (n, m, c, T, p) possesses a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For any pure strategy profile L = (σ1, . . . , σn), we define the following potential function:
Note, that the potential function sums up over all type agents. Consider a selfish step of type agent (r, t * ) from link k to link j. Define L = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) as the assignment resulting from L after this selfish step. By definition of selfish step,
\ {j, k} and for all t ∈ Tr \ {t * }, σr(t) ∈ [m]\{j, k}. Now consider the change ∆(Φ) due to this selfish step. It is ∆(Φ) = Φ(L ) − Φ(L) = ∆1(Φ) + ∆2(Φ) + ∆3(Φ), where ∆1(Φ) is the change in Φ that directly belongs to type agent (r, t * ), ∆2(Φ) is the change in Φ of type agents assigned to j and ∆3(Φ) is the change in Φ of type agents assigned to k. We have,
Hence, by law of conditional probability,
cj .
In the same way
where the last inequality follows from Equation (1). Thus, any selfish step decreases the value of the potential function Φ(L). Since the number of possible assignments is finite, the claim follows.
A generalization of the Bayesian routing game considered in this paper is a weighted Bayesian congestion game with linear cost functions. In a congestion game [26] each user i ∈ [n] can assign its traffic to a subset si of the resources out of a given set Si ⊆ 2
[m] of subsets of resources. The cost function of resource e ∈ [m] is given by an arbitrary nondecreasing linear cost function fe(x) = aex + be. A pure strategy profile L is then defined by L = (σ1, . . . , σn) with σi : Ti → Si for all i ∈ [n]. We can generalize Theorem 3.1 to this setting. Proof. For a pure strategy profile L define the following potential function
e (L, (p|ti = t)) + w(t)) + fe(w(t))¡ .
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 we can show that any selfish step decreases the value of ΦC . This generalizes a result of Fotakis et al. [8] to the Bayesian setting. In particular our potential function reduces to their potential function if each user has only a single type.
We now turn to the model of identical links and show how a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time if the type distribution is independent. Theorem 3.3. Let Γ be a Bayesian routing game with independent type distribution and identical links. It is possible to compute a (normal) pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ in polynomial time.
Proof. Given Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) calculate for each user i ∈ [n] its expected traffic E(i). Use these expected traffics to construct a KP-game Γ KP = (n, m, 1, {(t1, ..., tn)}, 1) where w(ti) = E(i) for all i ∈ [n]. Calculate a pure Nash equilibrium α : [n] → [m] for Γ KP in polynomial time by assigning the users in order of non-increasing user traffics to minimum load links (see [7] ). Now define L = (σ1, . . . , σn) and set σi(t) = α(i) for all (i, t), i ∈ [n], t ∈ Ti. It remains to show that L is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ.
Suppose by way of contradiction that α is a pure Nash equilibrium for Γ KP but that L is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ. The latter means that there is a type agent (i, t * ) of a user i ∈ [n] who can improve by moving from
Therefore, in Γ KP , user i can decrease its individual cost by switching from link α(i) to link l. This is a contradiction to the initial assumption that α is a Nash equilibrium for Γ KP .
The algorithm sketched in the proof of Theorem 3.3 cannot be used to compute pure Bayesian Nash equilibria for games with related links or for games with correlated type distribution. One reason is that it always computes a normal Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It is possible to construct a game with related links and independent type distribution for which a normal Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not exist. We now present a Bayesian routing game Γ with correlated type distribution and identical links for that a normal Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not exist. Set Γ = (3, 2, 1, T1 ×T2 ×T3, p) where the type sets are T1 = {t1, t 1 }, T2 = {t2, t 2 } and T3 = {t3, t 3 }. The types are of traffic w(t1) = w(t 1 ) = 1, w(t2) = w(t3) = 10 and w(t 2 ) = w(t 3 ) = 0. The correlated distribution p is given by p(t1, t 2 , t3) = p(t 1 , t2, t 3 ) = 1 20 and p(t1, t2, t3) = 9 10 . Observe that there is no normal equilibrium assigning the users 2 and 3 to the same link. If they are on different links the type t1 has an incentive to deviate from the link user 3 is assigned to whereas type t 1 has an incentive to deviate from the link user 2 is assigned to.
PROPERTIES OF FULLY MIXED BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section we study properties of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria for identical links. We start by showing that the individual costs of the users are maximized in a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium and we give a simple expression for the individual cost.
Theorem 4.1. Let Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) be a Bayesian routing game with identical links, let F be a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium and let Q be any Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ. Then for all i ∈ [n],
Proof. For any pair of users i, s ∈ [n] and any type t ∈ Ti define
as the expected load of user s, given that user i has type t.
We first prove that ui(Q, p) ≤ ui(F, p) for all i ∈ [n]. Let Q be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, let (i, t) be any type agent of user i and let k ∈ support(t). Then
. This holds for any fully mixed Nash equilibrium F, so v (i,t) (Q, p) is maximized in F for all i ∈ [n], t ∈ Ti. Thus,
for all i ∈ [n]. This proves the first part of the lemma. Now, we show that ui(
as needed.
We proceed by defining a fully mixed strategy profile F * .
Definition 4.1. Define the standard fully mixed strategy profile F * as the fully mixed strategy profile that assigns every type agent to every link with probability
It is easy to see that for any Bayesian routing game Γ with identical links the standard fully mixed strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This fact was for the special case of KP-games stated in [20] . We call a fully mixed strategy profile F * standard fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
There are Bayesian routing games for which the standard fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium is the unique fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For instance, let Γ be a Bayesian routing game with correlated type distribution p. Let p be such that for each t ∈ Ti, i ∈ [n] there is at most one type profile (t1, . . . , t, . . . , tn) ∈ T such that p(t1, . . . , t, . . . , tn) > 0. Such a game defines a set of disjoint KP-games. It was shown in [20] that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium for a KP-game is unique and has probabilities 1 m for all users and links. This implies that for Γ only the standard fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists.
In general there exists more than one fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the remainder of this section we study the structure of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria for Bayesian routing games with independent type distribution and identical links. Lemma 4.2 presents an exact characterization of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria in type agent representation. In particular Lemma 4.2 shows, how the traffic must be distributed to the links. Lemma 4.3 uses this result to show the dimension of the space of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Lemma 4.2. Let Γ be a Bayesian routing game with independent type distribution and identical links. Let R be a fully mixed strategy profile for Γ in type agent representation. Then R is a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if
Lemma 4.3. Let Γ be a Bayesian routing game with independent type distribution and identical links. Define τ as the total number of type agents. The dimension of the space of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria for Γ in type agent representation is (τ − n)(m − 1).
Proof. Let R be a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium in type agent representation. Define τi = |Ti| for all i ∈ [n]. Then τ = £ i∈[n] τi. By Lemma 4.2, we know that R is a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if
For each user i ∈ [n] the equations
have a solution space of dimension (τi −1)(m−1). Summing up over all i ∈ [n] proves the assumption.
SOCIAL COST AND COORDINATION RATIO

Social Cost as Expected Maximum Congestion
In this section we study social cost as the expected maximum congestion on any link, which is a measure for the welfare of the system. For the special case of KP-games this social cost measure was introduced in [16] and asymptotic tight bounds on coordination ratio were given in [2, 15] . Their techniques use Chernoff bounds to show that for identical links the quotient between the expected maximum load and the maximum expected load on a link is at most O( log m log log m ). These techniques cannot be applied for our Bayesian routing game as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 5.1. For every > 0, there exists a Bayesian routing game Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) with identical links and independent type distribution, and a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium L which has optimum social cost, such that
Proof. Define Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) with independent type distribution, where n = m, Ti = {ti,
. Let L be the pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium that maps both types of user i to link i. It easy to see that
The claim follows.
We now turn our attention to the standard fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium on identical links. For KP-games this is the only fully mixed equilibrium. Gairing et al. [11] conjectured that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium has worst social cost in the KP-model. Thus, the standard fully mixed Bayesian equilibrium is a candidate for a worst case example. The next lemma shows, that the coordination ratio of the standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium does not increase if we have incomplete information.
Theorem 5.2. Let Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) be a Bayesian routing game with identical links and let F * be the standard fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
Proof. Consider an arbitrary type profile t = (t1, ..., tn). Given t we define the game Γ KP (t)=(n, m, 1, {(t1, ..., tn)}, 1). We consider the fully mixed Nash equilibrium Q * for Γ KP (t). In Q * each user is assigned to each link with probability 1/m (see [20] ). According to [2] and [20] it holds that
= O( log m log log m ). Thus,
Since in general there is more than one fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the natural question arises, whether they have all the same social cost. As we see now, this is not the case.
Lemma 5.3. There exists a Bayesian routing game Γ with identical links and a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium F such that
Proof. Let Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) with n = 2, m = 3 and Ti = {ti, t i } with w(ti) = 2, w(t i ) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Furthermore, let p(i, ti) = p(i, t i ) = 1 2 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. F * assigns each type to each link with a probability of 1 3 . A simple calculation shows that SC MSP (F * , Γ) = 13 6 . The fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium F δ , 0 < δ < 1 4 , assigns all types of traffic 1 to link 1 with a probability of 1−4δ, to link 2 with a probability of 2δ and to link 3 with a probability of 2δ. Each type of traffic 2 is assigned to link 1 with a probability of 2δ, to link 2 with a probability of 1 2 − δ and to link 3 with a probability of
It is well known (see [19] ) that mixed Nash equilibria in games with complete information can be viewed as pure Bayesian Nash equilibria in a Bayesian game, where for each player all its types are identical. The following definition and theorem applies this result to Bayesian routing games.
Definition 5.1. A KP-like game is a Bayesian routing game with an independent type distribution such that w(t) = w(t ) for all types t, t ∈ Ti, i ∈ [n].
Theorem 5.4. Let Γ=(n, m, c, T, p) be any KP-like game and let L be a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ. Then Proof. The proof uses a well known construction (see [19] ). The upper bounds follow from the corresponding upper bounds on the coordination ratio for KP-games [2, 15] .
We close this section by giving a lower bound on coordination ratio for normal pure Bayesian Nash equilibria. It holds P (Xj ≥ k) > P (Xj = k) = 1 e·k! and therefore
Social Cost as Sum of Individual Costs
In this section, we study the coordination ratio for social cost as the sum of individual cost, which is a measure of average user welfare. In Theorem 5.6, we show that here fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria have worst social cost. This result is then used to proof an asymptotic tight bound on coordination ratio (Theorem 5.7). The next theorem follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 and the definition of social cost.
Theorem 5.6. Let Γ be a Bayesian routing game with identical links, let F be a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium and let Q be any Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ.
Theorem 5.7. Let Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) be a Bayesian routing game with identical links and let Q be any Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
and this bound is tight up to a factor of (1+ ) for any > 0, even if Γ is a KP-game.
Proof. By Theorem 5.6 it is suffices to show the claim for a fully mixed Nash equilibrium F. By Theorem 4.1 we
On the other hand, since ui(Q, p) ≥ E(i) for any user i ∈ [s], any strategy profile Q and any probability measure p, we have
The upper bound follows. We now proof that this upper bound is tight. To do so, we show that for any ε > 0, any number of users n and any number of links m ≥ 2, there is a game Γ = (n, m, 1,
E. Let Γ be a Bayesian routing game where every user i ∈ [n] has only a single type ti. First, notice that if n ≤ m than we can assign each user to a separate link which yields OPT SUM (Γ) = E. Now, let n > m and define the following game Γ: There are two sets of users U1, U2. The set U1 consists of n − m + 1 users with w(ti) = 1 for all i ∈ U1 and U2 consists of m − 1 users with w(ti) = k for all i ∈ U2. Let L be the pure strategy profile, that assigns all users from U1 to link m and each of the m−1 users from U2 separately to a link from [ ≤ ε, which completes the tightness proof.
Social Cost as Maximum Individual Cost
Now, we analyze the coordination ratio for social cost as the maximum of individual cost. Theorem 5.8 shows, that all fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria have worst social cost. In Theorem 5.9, we apply this result to proof an asymptotic tight bound on coordination ratio for Bayesian routing games and KP-games. The next theorem follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 and the definition of social cost.
Theorem 5.8. Let Γ be a Bayesian routing game with identical links, let F be a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium and let Q be any Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ. Then SC MAX (Q, Γ) ≤ SC MAX (F, Γ).
Theorem 5.9. Let Γ = (n, m, 1, T, p) be a Bayesian routing game with identical links and let Q be any Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then The bound from (a) is tight up to a factor of (1 + ) for any > 0 and the bound from (b) is tight.
Proof. We first show an upper bound on SC MAX (Q, Γ) that holds for both cases. Then we consider case (a) and (b) separately.
In each case we proof lower bounds on OPT MAX (Γ) and show tightness. Let F be a fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Γ. By This proves that the lower bound in (b) is tight.
